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inter-aMerican systeM enhances 
MOnitOring Of lesbian, gay, 
transgenDer, anD intersex persOns
In November 2011, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR, 
Commission) created a Unit on the Rights 
of Lesbian, Gay, Transgender and Intersex 
Persons (Unit) to improve its ability to 
protect the rights of lesbian, gay, transgen-
der, and intersex (LGBTI) individuals. The 
IACHR will evaluate the Unit’s work after 
a year and determine whether to create 
a rapporteur on LGBTI rights. The Unit 
was created after the Commission held a 
hearing focusing on the lack of protec-
tion of the LGBTI community throughout 
the Americas and states’ failures to pros-
ecute hate crimes against LGBTI persons. 
Article 1 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights requires signatories to 
respect the rights of all persons without 
discrimination, and Article 24 guarantees 
all people equal protection.
In establishing the Unit, the Commission 
cited the legal discrimination and physi-
cal violence suffered by LGBTI-identified 
people in the Americas. The Commission 
has addressed these human rights viola-
tions using precautionary measures, hear-
ings, and other promotional activities. For 
example, in an April 2011 hearing, the 
Commission heard from petitioners on 
the situation of the LGBTI community in 
Haiti after the earthquake. The petitioners 
explained that in times of chaos, violence 
against the LGBTI community increases; in 
fact, claims that the earthquake was Haiti’s 
punishment for allowing the presence of 
LGBTI persons are a common justification 
for renewed violence. In September 2010, 
the Commission found that Chile had dis-
criminated against a lesbian mother on the 
basis of her sexual orientation and referred 
her case to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR, Court).The Court 
found that Chile had violated her rights 
to equal protection under the law (Article 
24), privacy (Article 11), and her right to 
a family (Article 17) when it denied her 
custody of her children based on her sexual 
orientation.
The development of the Unit is part of a 
larger LGBTI advocacy movement within 
Latin America. In July 2010, Argentina 
became the first Latin American coun-
try to legalize same-sex marriage and 
adoption nationwide. In November 2011, 
Ecuador’s Ministry of Health closed 
approximately thirty clinics claiming to 
“cure homosexuality.”
Despite these advancements, LGBTI 
individuals still struggle with a culture 
that is slow to change and hesitant to 
recognize LGBTI-identified people equal 
rights. Additionally, many Latin American 
leaders balk at passing strong legislation 
protecting LGBTI rights, and often avoid 
prosecuting crimes against the LGBTI 
community as hate crimes due to their 
conservative cultural backgrounds.
The Unit forms part of the Commission’s 
plan of action to enhance protection of 
LGBTI rights in the region, and will hope-
fully counter the pervasive anti-LGBTI 
sentiment throughout the Americas. One 
of the Unit’s tasks will be to document 
sexual orientation and gender identity-
derived human rights issues and make 
recommendations on public policy, legisla-
tion, and judicial interpretation. Additional 
responsibilities include ensuring priori-
tization of discrimination cases against 
LGBTI persons and further developing the 
Organization of American States General 
Assembly’s resolutions pertaining to 
LGBTI rights.
Although many human rights organi-
zations such as the International Gay and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission cel-
ebrate the creation of the Unit, it has also 
been met with some criticism from conser-
vative commentators. Professor Ligia M. 
De Jesus of the Ave Maria School of Law 
claims that the Unit is an indication that 
“activists, rather than jurists” control the 
Commission. Others who have chosen to 
remain anonymous claim that by protecting 
the rights of certain groups, the Commission 
is failing to protect other groups.
The Commission’s creation of the Unit 
on the Rights of LGBTI persons is an indi-
cation that LGBTI rights are gaining more 
attention and protection in Latin America, 
even amidst discrimination and conserva-
tive social beliefs. The Unit’s increases the 
capacity of the Commission to protect vul-
nerable people throughout the Americas 
by focusing attention and resources on 
LGBTI rights, and will likely be followed 
by the creation of a rapporteurship.
cOnDitiOns iMprOve at brazilian 
prisOn; cOurt lifts prOvisiOnal 
Measures
In August 2011, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR, Court) 
lifted provisional measures it had issued 
in response to continuous acts of violence 
perpetrated by both guards and inmates 
at Urso Branco prison in Brazil. The 
improvement in conditions at Urso Branco, 
and the Court’s subsequent lifting of the 
provisional measures, are an indication 
that the Court can effect change outside 
the traditional adversarial process. Despite 
advancements at Urso Branco, however, 
the Court issued additional provisional 
measures in December 2010 in response 
to injuries at Unidade de Internação 
Socioeducativa (UNIS, Socio-Educational 
Internment Facility), a correctional facility 
in Brazil for children and adolescents, 
which indicates the continued need for 
systemic prison reform throughout the 
country.
Article 63.2 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights (American Convention) 
grants the Court authority to implement 
provisional measures in cases of extreme 
gravity and urgency to prevent irreparable 
damage to individuals. Provisional mea-
sures can be issued either upon submission 
of a case by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR, Commission) 
to the Court, or when the Commission 
itself requests them. The Court’s provisional 
measures are binding on Brazil because it 
has ratified the American Convention and 
recognized the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Articles 4 and 5 require Brazil to pro-
tect individuals’ rights to life and humane 
treatment.
The Inter-American System has 
addressed poor conditions at prisons and 
juvenile detention centers in Brazil through 
UPDATES FROM REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
1
Taylor et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
59
reports, hearings, court decisions, and pro-
visional measures since at least 1995. 
Violence and riots are not uncommon in 
Brazilian prisons. For example, in 2007, 
Sao Paolo’s most powerful criminal gang 
attacked prison staff and police officers in 
retaliation for the death of 111 prisoners 
who had died when a prison riot was sup-
pressed in 1992. In November 2010, eigh-
teen prisoners were killed in two separate 
riots in northeastern Brazil over access to 
water and the rate at which their criminal 
cases are reviewed.
In response to a fatal prison upris-
ing on the night of January 1, 2002, the 
Commission requested that provisional 
measures be issued to protect the inmates 
at Urso Branco prison. During the uprising, 
prison guards allowed inmates to attack 
each other until an assault team entered 
the prison the next morning to quell the 
riot. There were between twenty-seven and 
forty-five casualties. The Court ordered the 
state to take all measures necessary to pro-
tect the lives of the Urso Branco inmates, 
investigate the circumstances of the upris-
ing, and report back to the Court periodi-
cally. Despite the implementation of provi-
sional measures, in April 2004, another riot 
broke out at Urso Branco, resulting in the 
deaths of fourteen inmates. The most recent 
violent deaths at Urso Branco occurred in 
December 2007, when prison guards shot, 
but did not kill, four inmates during a two-
day period in August 2009.
In August 2011, the Court lifted the 
Urso Branco provisional measures after 
prisoners’ representatives agreed with 
national and state government representa-
tives that conditions had improved sig-
nificantly over the nine-year period. The 
State had submitted a report to the Court 
in July 2002 as evidence of improved 
conditions at Urso Branco, claiming that 
penitentiary agents were replacing the spe-
cial police force in charge of security, and 
that competitive public tests were being 
conducted to ensure that candidates for 
penitentiary agent positions were highly 
qualified. A September 2004 compliance 
report to the Court indicated that the 
prison had increased the number of guards 
and improved the quality of prison health 
care. In additional statements to the Court, 
Brazil claimed that 1) the number of Urso 
Branco prisoners had decreased; 2) the 
prison had been renovated; 3) free legal 
advice was now available to the inmates; 
and 4) steps had been taken to create 
a professional training program for the 
inmates.
Before lifting the provisional measures, 
federal and state authorities signed an 
agreement with the prisoners’ representa-
tives detailing plans for the improvement 
of Urso Branco. Brazil agreed to continue 
improvements in five areas: prison infra-
structure, enhanced training for prison per-
sonnel, investigations into prison deaths, 
improvement of social inclusion resources, 
and finally, research into methods used to 
combat violent prison culture.
Despite improvements after the Urso 
Branco violence, recent violence at UNIS 
is evidence that Brazilian prison conditions 
continue to be a problem. On January 31, 
2011, UNIS agents entered the facility 
after an escape attempt, and in the ensu-
ing confrontation between the agents and 
the juveniles, five juveniles were injured. 
On February 25, 2011, the Court imple-
mented provisional measures to protect 
UNIS inmates, requiring that Brazil effec-
tively protect the life and personal integrity 
of the youths in the detention center, and 
that the methods of punishment adhere to 
international norms.
Although the UNIS provisional mea-
sures indicate that the Brazilian detention 
system continues to warrant vast reform, 
the state’s efforts to ameliorate conditions 
in response to the Urso Branco provisional 
measures is a step in the right direc-
tion. The Inter-American System’s readi-
ness to compel member states to address 
poor prison conditions, and the subse-
quent improvements, are promising move-
ments for prisoner rights in greater Latin 
America. Time will tell whether advances 
achieved are systemic or merely reactive to 
discrete incidents.
Anna Taylor, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the Inter-American System 
for the Human Rights Brief.
eurOpean cOurt Of huMan rights
DecisiOn uphOlDing in vitrO 
fertilizatiOn ban relies On lacK 
Of eurOpean cOnsensus
The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) ruled on November 3 that no 
concensus has emerged on the continent 
to make in vitro fertilization a human 
right that requires protection. The decision 
comes only four years after the ECtHR 
concluded that a couple had the right to the 
procedure when the man was in prison. The 
Grand Chamber’s decision in S.H. v. Austria, 
however, was not based solely on prec-
edent or the specifics of Austria’s governing 
statute, but sought to discern how fertility 
treatment fit within Article 8 (respect for 
private and family life) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
There are varying methods of concep-
tion outside of copulation, and Austria’s 
law does not ban all forms. The country 
specifically bans in vitro fertilization — 
conception outside of the female’s body — 
involving third parties, that is, where either 
the ovum and sperm do not come from 
the involved couple, who must be married 
or in a similar situation. Under extreme 
circumstances, such as where the involved 
male is sterile, donor sperm can be used, 
but it must be implanted in vivo, mean-
ing the fertilization happens inside the 
woman’s body. By contrast, donor ovum 
can never be used for in vivo fertilization.
S.H. v. Austria was brought before the 
ECtHR by two couples unable to conceive 
without the use of banned third party in 
vitro procedures. In a decision on the 
merits, a chamber of the First Section of 
the Court found that Austria’s law violated 
Article 8, recognizing “the right of a cou-
ple to conceive a child and to make use of 
medically assisted procreation for that pur-
pose.” Because the Grand Chamber ruled 
this right existed, it found a violation of 
Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) 
by not allowing those unable to conceive 
access to that right. Austria appealed the 
decision to the higher Grand Chamber and 
argued that that although the right to con-
ceive should be protected, that right must 
not extend to all possible means of concep-
tion. In particular, the state was concerned 
with “selection” of children, exploitation 
of women, and the dilemmas created by 
children who would have two women who 
could claim motherhood.
In its judgment, which is final, the 
Grand Chamber struck down the lower 
chamber’s ruling, finding no violation of 
Article 8 of the ECHR, which also had the 
effect of making Article 14 inapplicable. In 
particular, the ECtHR found that Austria’s 
laws strike a balance between public and 
private concerns. That balance was used 
in the same manner as in what otherwise 
appears to be a conflicting ECtHR ruling 
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in favor of a prisoner whose wife was 
denied access to artificial insemination 
in Dickson v. United Kingdom. In S.H. v. 
Austria, the Grand Chamber cited studies 
documenting regulation of in vitro fer-
tilization across Europe, including bans 
on ovum donation in several European 
countries. For the Grand Chamber, a lack 
of consensus across the continent and 
an absence of long-standing principles 
signified that the issue before the court — 
whether Article 8 encompasses the right 
of couples to all possible means of medi-
cally induced conception — is not settled. 
That conclusion led the Grand Chamber 
to decline to step in and decide domestic 
policy, so long as states maintain that bal-
ance between public and private concerns.
In the fertilization debate, proponents 
of expanded access to scientific methods 
of conception call on Article 8 and simi-
lar protections that specifically identify a 
right to creation of a family as a dominant 
human right. The dissent in the Austria 
opinion cited a World Health Organization 
report that concluded that infertility affects 
80 million people worldwide. The authors 
of the report wrote that, “it is a central 
issue in the lives of the individuals who 
suffer from it. It is a source of social and 
psychological suffering for both men and 
women and can place great pressures on 
[a couple’s] relationship”. The other side 
approaches the debate by identifying the 
“moral and ethical issues,” as the court 
calls them, emphasizing the creation of life 
and the concern that fertility treatments 
often prioritize science over morality. One 
of the most prominent opponents of in vitro 
and other methods of artificial fertilization 
is the Catholic Church. In 2008 Pope John 
Benedict XVI, in reference to fertilization 
outside of the body, said, “When human 
beings in the weakest and most defenseless 
stage of their existence are selected, aban-
doned, killed or used as pure ‘biological 
matter’, how can it be denied that they are 
no longer being treated as ‘someone’ but as 
‘something’, thus placing the very concept 
of human dignity in doubt?”
The ECtHR’s restraint in interfering 
with fertilization policy reflects the court’s 
avoidance of choosing between two differ-
ent issues within the human rights frame-
work: the right to family life and a con-
cern for the law’s interference in deeply 
entrenched moral issues concerning the 
creation of life. Like in A, B, and C v. 
Ireland in 2010, when the court ruled that 
Ireland could not restrict access to legal 
abortions but declined to require the coun-
try to extend the practice beyond when a 
woman’s life is at risk due to pregnancy, 
the court stayed out of the broad moral 
decision. The court, in avoiding a sweeping 
ruling in S.H. v. Austria, ensured that the 
moral and religious issues neither over-
stepped individual protections nor were 
impugned by other human rights issues.
The ECtHR made it clear with its deci-
sion in S.H. v. Austria that it is not inclined 
to decipher the answer to the Pope’s ques-
tion. The court recognized that there might 
be changes to the overall trend in Europe 
and gave notice to the states that the issue 
“needs to be kept under review.” Unless 
consensus emerges, the ECtHR is con-
cerned with making sure both sides of a 
debate are represented in the law instead 
of choosing between the two.
eurOpean cOurt siDesteps 
exacerbating uK cOnflict in 
hearsay case
The Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) averted a 
possible conflict with the United Kingdom 
in December by overturning a lower 
Chamber ruling that almost completely 
barred the use of hearsay evidence to con-
vict a criminal and overruled exceptions 
in British law. The long awaited decision 
in the combined case of Al-Khawaja and 
Tahery v. the United Kingdom, — arriv-
ing more than 18 months after the Grand 
Chamber hearing — came as the UK 
assumed the rotating chairmanship of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, the larger body that oversees the 
ECtHR. The chairmanship has embold-
ened critics within the UK government to 
push for long-sought reforms to the Court 
and the country’s connection to it.
The Grand Chamber overruled the 
lower Chamber in the case and held that 
testimony is admissible where there is good 
reason a witness cannot testify directly and 
there are adequate safeguards to comply 
with Article 6 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR), which provides 
for the right to a fair trial. In the case of 
Al-Khawaja, a woman who accused the 
defendant of indecent assault was unable to 
testify because she had committed suicide, 
but a number of friends and the complaint 
of another alleged victim corroborated her 
affidavit. The Grand Chamber upheld this 
use of hearsay evidence. In the case of 
Tahery, however, one witness refused to 
testify in the trial involving a stabbing dur-
ing a gang fight and the case hinged criti-
cally on that witness’ testimony, which the 
defense had no other method of challeng-
ing. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR did 
not object to the barring of this testimony. 
The approach essentially adopts the British 
rule of a generally strong restriction on 
hearsay evidence with an exclusion for 
only particular circumstances.
Previously, the UK has bristled over 
ECtHR-imposed restrictions on its ability 
to deport foreign nationals — including 
those convicted of violent crimes like 
rape — and for more than six years has 
refused to adhere to an ECtHR deci-
sion requiring that convicts be allowed to 
vote. In a January 24, 2012 speech before 
the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly, Cameron staked out the UK’s 
plans for reform in response to what he 
called growing unease over the court. 
“When controversial rulings overshadow 
the good and patient long-term work that 
has been done,” he said, “that not only fails 
to do justice to the work of the court it has 
a corrosive effect on people’s support for 
human rights.”
A leaked draft of the UK’s plan for 
ECtHR reform — called the Brighton 
Declaration — surfaced in February 2012 
and advocates for bold reform in three sig-
nificant areas. First it recommends insert-
ing into the ECHR explicit recognition of 
the principles of “subsidiarity” and the 
“margin of appreciation,” both of which 
operate to recognize the Court’s deference 
to national courts. Secondly, the docu-
ment recommends a system whereby a 
national court could refer a point of law to 
the ECtHR. Third, it proposes altering the 
admissibility requirements under Article 
35 to both shrink the time limit under 
which an application can be filed and 
make clear that the default is that an appli-
cation is inadmissible if it is the same in 
substance as a matter decided by a national 
court taking into account the convention. 
The proposals will be debated at a confer-
ence in April at the end of the UK’s term at 
the chairmanship.
The Cameron government has also 
sought reform on the domestic level, which 
is controlled by the Human Rights Act of 
1998, which inter alia committed British 
courts to give effect to the decisions of the 
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ECtHR. Political conflict lead one conser-
vative member to resign from the eight-
person panel working to draft a British Bill 
of Rights as a possible replacement for the 
Human Rights Act. Any progress the panel 
might make would also be limited by the 
UK’s treaty obligations under the ECHR, 
which makes all decisions by the ECtHR 
binding upon member states.
The reforms envisioned by the Brighton 
Declaration would further the British 
objectives by affecting what comes out 
of Strasbourg, not how it is implemented. 
The recommendations found within the 
proposal would likely make decisions such 
as Al-Khawaja and Tahery — where the 
national courts were given deference — a 
common occurrence. Although this would 
protect the interests of the states, the reforms 
would also meet an intended purpose of 
keeping cases out of the Court. The proposal 
calls this efficiency, but it would also have 
the effect of effect of restricting individuals’ 
access to the court as a final refuge.
ECtHR President Nicholas Bratza 
warned political leaders against using 
“emotion and exaggeration” to criticize the 
court in a speech delivered two day’s after 
Cameron’s address. Bratza — a British 
lawyer — defended the court and empha-
sized its importance amidst the European 
debt crisis. “Human rights, the rule of law 
and justice seem to be slipping down the 
political agenda in the current economic 
climate,” he said. “We must continue to 
ensure that the court remains strong, inde-
pendent and courageous in its defense of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.”
Matthew Lopas, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the European Court of 
Human Rights for the Human Rights Brief.
african huMan rights systeM
the east african cOurt Of Justice 
asserts its JurisDictiOn tO hear 
the inDepenDent MeDical legal 
unit’s reference against the 
Kenyan gOvernMent
On June 29, 2011, The Independent 
Medical Legal Unit (IMLU) achieved a 
monumental victory in the East African 
Court of Justice (EACJ) in its case against 
the Republic of Kenya, when the court 
denied a motion to dismiss filed by Kenya’s 
Attorney General and ordered the case 
to proceed. IMLU is a non-governmental 
organization with a mandate to protect 
Kenyans from human rights violations 
perpetrated by the government. IMLU 
filed the reference against the Kenyan 
government seeking to hold it accountable 
for its failure to investigate and, if neces-
sary, prosecute members of the Kenyan 
security forces responsible for extraju-
dicial killings, torture, and other human 
rights violations committed in Mt. Elgon 
District during the 2006-2008 violent con-
flict between Kenyan security forces and 
the insurgent Sabaot Land Defense Force 
(SLDF). Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
estimates that Kenyan security forces car-
ried out hundreds of extrajudicial killings, 
detained and tortured thousands more, 
and are responsible for nearly 200 forced 
disappearances in violations of several 
international human rights conventions as 
well as the Kenyan Constitution.
In seeking dismissal, the Attorney 
General relied on Article 27 of the Treaty 
for the Establishment of the East African 
Community (Treaty), which limits the 
jurisdiction of the EACJ to interpreting and 
applying the Treaty and expressly restricts 
the Court from deciding cases related to 
human rights issues until a protocol — 
not yet completed — expands the Court’s 
jurisdiction over such cases. In response, 
the IMLU claimed that a good faith read-
ing of Article 27 of the Treaty pursuant 
to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties established the jurisdiction of the 
Court to hear allegations of violations of 
the fundamental principles of the Treaty. 
In the present case, these principles are 
set forth in Articles 6(d) and 7(2) — the 
obligation of states parties to ensure rule 
of law and good governance, and to main-
tain universal human rights standards. The 
EACJ agreed with IMLU and asserted its 
jurisdiction despite the Attorney General’s 
objections. According to the Court, IMLU 
allegations are based on violations of fun-
damental Treaty principles, and the mere 
mention of alleged human rights violations 
in the reference does not purge the Court 
of its jurisdiction over the case.
The Attorney General also argued that 
the reference was time barred pursuant to 
Article 30(2) of the Treaty. According to 
the Attorney General, IMLU knew about 
the complaint in 2008 and failed to file the 
reference to the EACJ within two months 
thereafter. Yet the EACJ rejected this argu-
ment, ruling that the alleged violations 
— Kenyan government’s failure to investi-
gate alleged human rights violations — are 
continuous from the time of the incident 
until IMLU concluded that the Kenyan 
government was not going to investigate 
and, where necessary, prosecute for alleged 
human rights violations.
Though IMLU gained a significant 
victory with the EACJ ruling against the 
dismissal of the reference as a whole, 
the Court dismissed the case against 
the Minister for Internal Security of the 
Republic of Kenya, the Chief of General 
Staff of the Republic of Kenya, and the 
Commissioner of Police of the Republic 
of Kenya — all of whom IMLU sought 
to hold accountable. The EACJ ruled that 
under Article 30, the individuals named in 
the lawsuit cannot be joined because they 
are merely employees of the Kenyan gov-
ernment and are therefore neither a state 
party nor an institution of the East African 
Community (EAC) that can be sued in 
the EACJ. Accordingly, only the Kenyan 
government can be held accountable by 
the EACJ for failing to ensure the rule of 
law, so only the Attorney General may be 
named in the lawsuit.
The EACJ’s rejection of the Attorney 
General’s opposition is significant beyond 
the case at issue. The decision effectively 
expands the jurisdiction of the EACJ to 
cases that detail human rights abuses, 
provided those cases focus primarily on 
violations of the Treaty. The failure of the 
Kenyan government to investigate details 
of atrocities committed during conflict in 
the Mt. Elgon region leaves the families of 
victims in plight with no means of obtain-
ing closure and justice for their loved ones. 
The reference filed before the EACJ seeks 
to hold the Kenyan government account-
able for this failure, and the court’s denial 
of the respondent’s opposition permits the 
case to move forward.
the african cOurt affirMeD 
its sOle JurisDictiOn Over the 
interpretatiOn Of the east african 
cOMMunity treaty
On December 1, 2011, the East African 
Court of Justice (EACJ, Court) held that 
eligible applicants may file a reference 
alleging violations of the East African 
Community Treaty (Treaty) without first 
exhausting local remedies, and further 
issued a declaration that Rwanda breached 
the Treaty when it unlawfully detained 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Rugigana Ngabo of 
the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). The 
case Plazeda Rugumba v. Attorney General 
of the Republic of Rwanda was initially 
filed by Lt. Col Ngabo’s wife in November 
2010, urging the Court to declare that the 
government of Rwanda detained her hus-
band incommunicado — without means 
of communication. Lt. Col Ngabo was not 
placed in preventive detention under law-
ful authority until January 2011, more than 
two months after the reference was filed.
The Court found that Rwanda violated 
Articles 6(9) and 7(2), which broadly 
oblige Rwanda as a party to the Treaty to 
adhere to principles of universal human 
rights through democracy and good gov-
ernance. Mrs. Ngabo’s reference also 
sought to hold the Secretary General of 
the East African Community accountable 
for breach of Article 29 of the Treaty, spe-
cifically for failing to take necessary mea-
sures to oversee the compliance of Rwanda 
with the Treaty regarding the arrest and 
detention of Lt. Col Ngabo. The Court, 
however, dismissed the allegation against 
the Secretary General of the East African 
Community for lack of notice.
Mrs. Ngabo’s reference alleged that 
her husband was unlawfully detained 
incommunicado without trial as a threat 
to national security. According to Mrs. 
Ngabo’s application, her efforts to obtain 
information about the whereabouts of her 
husband had been futile to that point, and 
her husband had been denied his rights to 
visitation by either a health professional or 
even the Red Cross. In response, Rwanda 
denied the allegations, instead arguing 
that the Lt. Col Ngabo was in “preven-
tive detention” in a military prison where 
the government extended him full rights 
within the perimeters of the Rwandan laws, 
including visitation rights. The Rwandan 
government conceded, however, that it did 
not lawfully move to place Lt. Col Ngabo 
in preventive detention until January 2011, 
after Mrs. Ngabo filed the reference before 
the EACJ. Lt. Col Ngabo’s detention from 
his August 2010 arrest to that point was 
found by the Military Court of Rwanda to 
constitute a breach of Articles 90 though 
100 of the Rwandan Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which broadly govern custody 
pending investigation. More significantly, 
the Rwandan government challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with 
domestic affairs by hearing cases implicat-
ing human rights issues that are pending 
before local courts.
The Court rejected these arguments, 
holding that the jurisdictional challenge 
was premised on a mistaken interpreta-
tion of Mrs. Ngabo’s application to the 
Court. Mrs. Ngabo has sought a declara-
tion that Rwanda breached its obligation 
under the Treaty. To that end, the reference 
implicates the Court’s Article 27(1) power 
to interpret the Treaty and ensure compli-
ance. Significantly, the Treaty does not 
have an express provision that mandates 
that applicants exhaust all other remedies 
before seeking a remedy from the Court 
for an alleged violation of the Treaty. As 
such, the Court may entertain the reference 
even if the matter is pending before the 
Rwandan courts. The fact that Rwandan 
courts took action — notably, after the 
reference was filed — does not oblige the 
Court to then relinquish its exclusive juris-
diction to interpret Treaty and its mandate 
to ensure compliance.
The Court does not typically interfere 
with the states’ enforcement of its criminal 
law. However, in light of the absence of an 
express provision barring the jurisdiction 
of the Court over cases where applicants 
did not exhaust local remedies, as well 
as the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to 
review alleged violations of the Treaty, the 
Court decided to entertain the reference. 
Accordingly, the Court found that Rwanda 
detained Lt.-Col in violation of Article 6, 
which restricts deprivation of individual’s 
liberty only in circumstances where the 
individual has violated established laws of 
the state, and Article 7, which grants indi-
viduals the right to be heard and go before 
trial within a reasonable time before an 
impartial court or tribunal.
Consequently, the Court issued a dec-
laration stating the Rwanda breached 
Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty. By declaring 
that applicants do not need to exhaust local 
remedies, the Court effectively expands 
the number of individuals who can file 
applications with the Court, and possi-
bly increase the volume of cases that the 
Court considers. Furthermore, the decision 
indicates that although the Court does not 
directly interfere with domestic criminal 
matters, it retains jurisdiction to review 
the actions of states in the enforcement of 
their domestic in areas where compliance 
with the Treaty is implicated. As such, the 
Court’s decision in this case indicates a 
balance between the state’s rights to imple-
ment its laws and the Court’s mandate to 
ensure compliance with the Treaty.
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